The goal of environmental policy is to protect the well-being of humans and the ecosystems vital to human existence. Because benefit-cost analyses are now required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, much attention has been paid to the development of practical, credible approaches for estimating the benefits and costs of environmental programs. Although policy makers have a good handle on measuring the explicit costs associated with increased environmental protection, at present several disparate approaches are utilized to measure economic values of environmental goods and services. Arguably the most contentious of these approaches is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which allows the researcher to measure the total value of the commodity in question (see Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman's [1994] critical review). Chief amongst these concems is whether hypothetical bias is inherent in CVM responses.
experiments that indicates hypothetical bias can be overcome by an appropriate ex ante design they refer to as a "cheap talk" scheme.2 The underlying premise behind Cummings and Taylor's design is that by making hypothetical bias an integral part of the contingent value questionnaire, the researcher can induce truthtelling. Their cheap talk experiments validated this conjecture, as hypothetical bias was effectively eliminated in open referenda for three public goods.
The goal of this study is to take the cheap talk design to a well-functioning marketplace and auction off sportscards. Besides providing a field validity test, I also explore the generality of Cummings and Taylor's findings by examining whether experience with the good in question affects hypothetical bias through inclusion of both card dealers and nondealers in the field auctions. The theory of value formation suggests that experienced bidders may not be easily swayed by the cheap talk design as they have a well-structured preference ordering for the good in question and should therefore rely on few, if any, external signals when formulating their value.
I. Experimental Design
This study complements Cummings and Taylor (CT hereafter) by taking their methodology to the field. They designed a classroom experiment with student participants to examine whether a cheap talk script describing the nature of hypothetical bias can eliminate the gap between intentions and actions.3 Their experiment was designed to satisfy some of the contingent valuation criteria as proposed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration' s (NOAA) blue-ribbon panel-e.g., dichotomous choice questions in a referendum format. CT find that although a short cheap talk script does not mitigate hypothetical bias, a longer version does eliminate hypothetical bias.
The current study extends CT's work in numerous dimensions. First, I use subjects of all ages in an actual marketplace rather than students in the lab.4 Another significant difference is that I have two heterogeneous groups of subjects-those that have market experience with the good (sportscard dealers) and those that have limited experience (nondealers).S A third disparity is that I gather data via one-on-one personal interviews, whereas CT gather data in a group setting. Since CVM questions oftentimes involve complex scenarios that require careful explanation, close control of the pace of the interview is necessary. For this, and other important reasons, the method of choice for most CVM surveys is one-on-one in-person interviews (see, e.g., Robert Cameron Mitchell and Richard T. Carson, 1989 Each participant's experience followed four steps: (1) inspection of the good, (2) learning the auction rules, (3) placing one bid, and (4) conclusion of the transaction. In Step 1, a potential subject approached the administrator's table and inquired about the sale of the sportscard displayed on the table. The monitor then invited the potential subject to participate in an auction for the sportscard that would take about five minutes. If the individual agreed, the monitor briefly explained that we were auctioning off the sportscard displayed on the table. The participant could pick up and visually examine the card. The card was sealed with the appropriate grade clearly marked on the cardholder. The monitor worked one-on-one with the participant and no time limit was imposed on his or her inspection of the card.
In
Step 2, the administrator gave the participant an instruction sheet that consisted of two parts: (1) an auction rules sheet which also included an illustrative example, and (2) a bidding sheet.7 In the actual auction treatments, subjects read that "the winner of the card will pay a price equal to the amount of the secondhighest bid." For the hypothetical auctions, I follow CT's nomenclature and state: "suppose you were to bid on the sportscard on the table, if the winner of the card were to pay a price equal to the amount of the second-highest bid, how much would you bid?" Subjects participating in the hypothetical with cheap talk auctions were read the cheap talk script just prior to placing their hypothetical bid. The general cheap talk script is from CT, with necessary changes due to differences in the allocation mechanism and good. Excerpts of the script read as follows:
... in a recent study, several different groups of people bid on a sportscard just like the one you are about to bid on. Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it will be for you. No one had to pay money if they won the sportscard. The results of these studies were that on average, across the groups, people overstated their actual willingness to pay by 150 percent. That's quite a difference, isn't it?
We call this a "hypothetical bias." Hypothetical bias is the difference that we continually see in the way people respond to hypothetical situations as compared to real situations....
How can we get people to think about their bid in a hypothetical auction like they think in a real auction, where if they win they'll really have to pay money? How do we get them to think about what it means to really dig into their pocket and pay money, if in fact they really aren't going to have to do it? Let me tell you why I think that we continually see this hypothetical bias, why people behave differently in a hypothetical auction than they do when the auction is real. I think that when we bid in a hypothetical auction we bid our In any case, I ask you to bid just exactly as you would bid if you were really going to face the consequences of your bid: which is to pay money if you win. Please keep this in mind in our auction. 6 The empirical evidence concerning the demand revelation properties of Vickrey second-price auctions is mixed, and remains a point of serious debate. In a recent study, List and Shogren (1999) found that in second-price auctions for consumption goods, subjects submit relatively low bids in early rounds of multiple-round auctions, but bids quickly stabilize after 1 or 2 trials-after subjects received important market feedback. As mentioned in footnote 5, the proliferation of auctions for sportscards has presumably provided important market experience to my subjects, who were all recruited on the floor of a sportscard show.
7 Appendix A contains a copy of the experimental instructions.
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After the monitor answered all questions, the subject worked through an illustrative example.8 Following completion of the example, the participant placed a bid on the bidding sheet (Step 3). In
Step 4, the administrator explained that if the participant won the auction, she would be contacted by telephone within three days after the show. Upon receipt of payment for the card, the card would be sent to her via courier, postage free. In the nondealer experiments, the treatment type was changed at the top of each hour, so subjects' treatment type was determined based on the time they visited the auction table at the card show. The dealer treatments took place in the same fashion as the nondealer treatments, with one exception. Instead of waiting for participants to arrive at the auction booth, the administrator visited each dealer at his/her booth before the sportscard show opened, alternating the auction format and card type. The nondealer treatments took approximately 14 hours to complete (12 P.M. to 7 P.M. on Saturday and Sunday), while the dealer treatments took about five hours (7 A.M. to 12 noon on Saturday).9 Table 1 summarizes the experimental data.10 The first row in Table 1 shows the means for each treatment type and reveals that dealers' bids are significantly higher than nondealers' bids for each auction type. In addition, the number of zero bids in each treatment shows a marked increase when moving from dealer to nondealer auctions. These findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley, 2000), and illustrate that dealer demand curves are located above ordinary consumer demand curves.
II. Results
At issue is the gap between actual and hypothetical behavior, with and without cheap talk. In the dealer treatments, mean bids in both hypothetical regimes are greater than the average real bid; whereas in the nondealer treatments, mean bids in the actual and hypothetical with cheap talk auctions are similar, but much lower than the mean hypothetical bid. The ratio of mean hypothetical to mean real is approximately 1.85-1.95 for both dealers and nondealers. These ratios are in accord with results from other card auctions that use ex post techniques to calibrate actual and hypothetical behavior (see, e.g., List and Shogren, 1998a).
The fourth and fifth rows in Table 1 Table 1 , which test whether the sampled populations have identical probability distributions, reveal the same insights-the distribution of actual bids is to the left of both hypothetical bid distributions (z = -2.45; z = -2.27), while the hypothetical distributions are situated similarly (z = -0.22). These results suggest that although bids in the hypothetical with cheap talk design are lower than bids in the hypothetical auction, the cheap talk design failed to eliminate hypothetical bias in the dealer valuation exercises. 8 To test whether subjects understood the auction mechanisms, I ran a pilot study in November 1998 at a similar sportscard show in Orlando. On completion of these hypothetical auctions, subjects answered questions about their understanding of the auction rules. Approximately 15 people took part in each auction type, and no one had any problem understanding the allocation and price rules.
9 The dealer sessions were completed in a more timely manner because the dealers (in their booths) were more accessible.
10 As an external validity check, consider the relationship between winning bids (given in rows 3 and 4 of Table  1) Results from the nondealer treatments stand in stark contrast to those in the dealer auctions. t-tests in rows 5 and 6 suggest the average hypothetical bid is statistically different from the mean hypothetical with cheap talk and mean actual bid at the p < 0.05 level (t = -2.29; t = -2.38). In addition, the mean actual bid is not statistically different from the hypothetical with cheap talk mean bid at conventional significance levels (t = -0.07). Mann-Whitney tests of whether the sampled populations have identical probability distributions reveal the same insights-actual and hypothetical with cheap talk bids are significantly less than bids in the hypothetical regime (z = -1.96; z = -2.26). These results suggest that the hypothetical with cheap talk design effectively eliminated hypothetical bias for ordinary consumers.
Although these findings are suggestive, they may be an artifact of variables left uncontrolled, such as subject-specific characteristics that affect bidding behavior.11 To supplement the results in Table 1 Table 2 . Because the Tobit and OLS models yield similar insights, I will focus the discussion on the coefficient estimates from the OLS models. For both bidder types, the empirical estimates serve to strengthen the findings in Table 1 .13 In the dealer auctions, the coefficient of Dreal is negative and significantly different from zero at the p < 0.05 level. Yet, the coefficient of Dcheaptalk is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels, suggesting behavior in the cheap talk auction is not different from behavior in the purely hypothetical auction for dealers. Furthermore, results from a likelihood-ratio test in the bottom panel of Table 2 suggest that 01 0 12 (X2(1 d.f.) = 5.60), implying subjects behaved differently across the actual and hypothetical with cheap talk auctions at the p < 0.05 level. These results indicate that even after controlling for subject characteristics, the empirical evidence suggests that the cheap talk design failed to eliminate bias in the dealer treatments.
Empirical results in the nondealer treatments are in strong favor of the cheap talk design. Estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Burns (1985) compared the price strategy choices of inexperienced students with those of highly experienced wool buyers and found that the wool buyers had developed valuation strategies that tended to be immutable. The bidding strategy anomaly observed in Burns' data is well summed up by one of the wool buyers, who commented "With us it is a reflex action. Possibly others could orientate themselves more quickly" (Burns, 1985 
